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THE PAIN OF LOVE: SPOUSAL IMMIGRATION AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA-A REGIME IN
CHAOS?
E. Odhiambo-Abuya t
Abstract: A fundamental step that the 1994 Australian Migration
Regulations developed into the immigration framework was to grant certain concessions
to non-Australian spouses and interdependent partners who suffer domestic violence at
the hands of their Australian counterparts. Victims of domestic violence are eligible to
apply for permanent residence notwithstanding the otherwise applicable two-year waiting
period. To understand the domestic violence exception, this Article explores the
jurisprudence that has emerged from courts and other immigration tribunals. The Article
proposes that further legislative and policy changes should be made in order to seal
identified "gaps," and to provide clear guidance to interested parties, judges and tribunal
members who hear such matters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the
Lord.... Husbands love your wives, even as Christ loved the
church, and gave himself for it[.]... So men ought to love their
wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth
himself For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth
and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church.
International law recognizes the right to marry and have a family as a
fundamental human right, since it is through this basic unit of society that
the existence of human life rests. Formal recognition dates as far back as
1948 when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2 stated two
important rights for this institution: First, that "men and women of full age.
. . have the right to marry and found a family"; second, "that the family is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society." 3 The Universal
1 Faculty of Law, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya, and S.J.D. Candidate, The University of Sydney,
Sydney, Australia, e-mail:Edwina@keller.law.usyd.edu.au. I would like to thank Kira Raif, Joellen Riley,
Prof. Terry Carney, Dr. Mary Crock, Joseph Kihanya, and Serah Kimani for their comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the Editorial Staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal
for their excellent editorial advice and suggestions. Any errors or omissions are entirely mine.Ephesians 5:22-29 (King James) (emphasis added).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 187th mtg. at 22,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
3 Id. art. 16.
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Declaration of Human Rights called upon member States to ensure that
protection was granted to this institution, so that it-and society--could
survive and continue.4 Subsequent international instruments, especially the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 and, more
recently, the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women 6 have followed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights' footsteps.7
States, like Australia, that subscribe to the dualist legal system 8 must
legislatively incorporate an international treaty's principles and objectives
4 Id.
'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR , 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976
[hereinafter ICCPR].
6 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), entered into force Sept. 3, 1981
[hereinafter CEFDW].
7 Article 16(1) of the CEFDW requires States Parties to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations" and "ensure"
equality between men and women with regard to the following rights:
(a) [R]ight to enter into marriage;
(b) [R]ight to freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and
full cosent;
(c) [Siame rights and responsibilities during marriage and its dissolution;
(d) [Parental] rights in matters relating to their children....
(e) [S]ame rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their
children and to have access to the information, education, and means to enable them
to exercise these rights;
(f) [S]ame rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship
and adoption of children...,
(g) [S]ame personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family
name, a profession and an occupation;
(h) [S]ame rights . . . in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management,
administration, enjoyment and disposition ofproperty....
Id. Similarly, the ICCPR recognizes that:
I. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and found a family....
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending
spouses.
4. States parties to the present Covenant shall take all appropriate steps to ensure
equality of rights and responsibilities to spouses as to marriage, during marriage and
at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution.
ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 23.
8 This is different from nations, such as the United States, which follow the monist system dictating
that once a Treaty is ratified its provisions automatically become part of the municipal law as "self-
executing" treaties. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (5th ed. 1998). A
self-executing treaty is defined as "one that can be directly applied by courts or executive agencies without
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into domestic law for it to have any local impact. 9 Ratification of a treaty,
without more, fails to create any rights, duties or legitimate expectation that
a decision-maker should, or will, abide by its provisions.'0 In Australia, the
Marriage Act, 1961, read together with the Family Law Act, 1975, provides
for the right to marry and found a family."' The spirit of both acts
emphasizes the need to keep the family institution intact. While recognizing
that disagreements may, and actually do, arise within this institution, the acts
prescribe possible channels of resolution that spouses may explore-
counseling, mediation, arbitration, conciliation, and/or reconciliation.' 2 This
is the case irrespective of whether an Australian citizen or permanent
resident enters into a relationship as a spouse or interdependent partner with
a fellow Australian or non-Australian, overseas or onshore. This Article
focuses on the migration aspects of relationships between Australians and
non-Australians.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Migration Act, 1958, and the
Migration Regulations, ("Regulations"), introduced in 1994, spouses and
interdependent partners of Australian citizens and permanent residents
wishing to come into Australia may apply for a two year temporary visa.
3
After this "probationary" period, they are eligible to apply for a permanent
visa. 14 The permanent visa is granted once the Department of Immigration
the need for further measures." Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United
States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 627 (1986).
9 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V § 51(xxix). Along the same lines, Judge McLelland in Bluett v.
Fadden (1956) 56 N.S.W. St.R. 254, 262 (Austl.), argues:
[A] treaty does not by itself have legislative effect and cannot be the subject of
judicial cognizance until it has received legal sanction and has been carried into operation
by appropriate legislative action. It is the legislation that creates the rights which are
justiciable, [thus] the rights can only be said to arise under the legislation and [not]
under the Treaty.
Id. (emphasis added).
" See Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 128 A.L.R. 353 (Austl.),
in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senators Gareth Evans and Michael Lavarch issue a joint
statement. See also Australia's Answers to Questions asked by the European Committee on Legal
Co-Operation of the Council of Europe in a Survey of State Practice on Treaty-Making, October 1986, It
AUSTRALIAN Y. B. OF INT'L L. 500 (1991).
11 Marriage Act, 1961, § § 11-12 (Austl.).
12 Id. §§ 9C-D; Family Law Act, 1975, pts. II and III (Austl.).
13 Migration Regulations, 1994, sched. 2, subclasses 309 (Spouse Provisional, applying from
overseas), 820 (Spouse Provisional, applying onshore), 310 and 820 (for interdependent categories)
(Austl.).
14 Id. subclass 100 (Spouse Permanent, applying from overseas), 110 and 814 (interdependent
categories).
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and Multicultural Affairs ("DIMA") is satisfied that the relationship is still
"genuine and continuing."'' 5
There are three exceptions to this general rule. 16 The first exception is
for partners that have been married for more than five years, or for two years
or more and have a child as a result of the union. The second exception is
relevant where the Australian spouse dies. The third exception applies
where the non-Australian spouse or partner is domestically abused by their
Australian counterpart. This Article focuses on the last category, victims of
domestic violence. The domestic violence exception more or less "rescues"
these victims from the pain, suffering, and risk of deportation they would
otherwise face if they remained in abusive relationships. 17 Even so,
domestic violence claimants must satisfy specific legal tests required by the
Regulations. This Article evaluates those tests. Notwithstanding the various
concessions that have been introduced for victims of domestic violence, this
Article argues that further legal and policy changes are necessary to fully
protect victims of domestic violence.
Part I1 of this Article examines the Australian general rule on spousal
immigration and the domestic violence exception. In evaluating the
domestic violence exception, the primary focus is on the definition of
"domestic violence," who is a "competent" witness in such claims, and the
definition of "competent" evidence. Evaluating relevant statutory provisions
and case law, Part III identifies and discusses shortcomings in this branch of
Australian law. First, this Article argues that whether the term "domestic
violence" is restricted to physical violence, or may also be applied to
emotional and psychological abuse remains unsettled. Second, some
decision-makers have been insensitive to foreign cultural values and beliefs,
which prohibit the reporting of what might be seen by western eyes as
constituting domestic violence. Overall, this insensitivity weakens victims'
claims. Third, ignorance and the lack of knowledge about where victim can
seek assistance undermine the claimants' chances of success. Fourth,
decision-makers emphasize procedural technicalities at the expense of
substance. Legitimate claims are eliminated as a result. Part IV concludes
with specific policy and legal recommendations to improve the current legal
status.
15 Id. Regs. 1.09A(2)(c)(ii) and 1.15(IA)(b)(ii); see also Nassouh v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 788.16 These exceptions are spelled out in the regulations governing the grant of permanent visas. See
Migration Regulations, 1994, sched. 2, subclasses 100.221 (Spouse Permanent, applying from overseas)
and 801.221 (Spouse Permanent, applying on-shore) (Austl.). For definition of the terms, "long-term
spouse relationship" and "long-term interdependent relationship," see id. Reg. 1.03.
1 See MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 77 (1998).
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II. GENERAL MIGRATION RULES FOR SPOUSES AND DOMESTIC PARTNERS
AND THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTION
Under the Migration Act and Regulations foreign spouses can apply
for temporary visas onshore in Australia, or from overseas. As a general
rule, a permanent visa is issued after two years and once DIMA is satisfied
that the relationship is relatively permanent. However, there is an exception
to this general rule. Spouses and interdependent partners who are abused by
their Australian counterparts need not stay in such relationships for two
years before they become eligible to apply for permanent visas. However,
for an individual to apply before this period expires, he or she must prove
they suffered the claimed domestic violence.
A. Coming to Australia: Onshore and Offshore Applications
The Regulations prescribe two paths that foreign spouses wishing to
immigrate to Australia can follow. Potential immigrants can lodge their
applications offshore or onshore.' 8 Either way, a non-Australian spouse or
partner must be sponsored, or nominated, by their Australian counterpart.' 9
The Regulations do not clearly state the requirements of nomination,
defining a "nominator" simply as, "a person who nominates ...another
person." 20 One may infer that "nominate" is synonymous with
"sponsorship," which requires financial support of the visa applicant for at
least two years, based on Australian standards, once a spouse visa
21
application is lodged.
The financial requirement seems to presume that for at least two years
a nominee is incapable of finding a reasonable and sufficient source of
income, or that a nominee will require at least two years to gain financial
stability. This does not mean, however, that sponsors who are not
financially secure cannot bring their spouses or partners into Australia. The
Minister of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
("Minister") can request an assurance of support, which can be provided by
anyone, not necessarily the sponsor or guarantor.22 If this requirement is
18 Migration Regulations, 1994, sched. 1, items 1124B, 1129, 1120A, and 1214C (Austl.).
'9 Id. sched. 2, subclasses 100.221(2)(b) and 801.221(2)(c).
20 Migration Act, 1975, division 1.2(1.13) (Austl.).
21 Id. Division 1.4(1.2)(2)(c) of the Migration Act defines "sponsorship" to mean an "undertak[ing]
to assist [an] applicant, to the extent necessary financially and in respect of accommodation, [for] at the
[first] two years, immediately following the [lodging of a spouse or interdependent visa]." Id.
22 See generally Migration Regulations, 1994, subdivision 2.7.2 (Austl.).
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met, a nominee is eligible to apply for a temporary visa depending on his or
her physical location. 23 The married nominee may apply for a spouse 24 or a
spouse provisional2 5 visa. Interdependent partners, on the other hand, may
apply for interdependency 26 or interdependency provisional 27 visa. A fiancee
is eligible to apply for prospective marriage 28 and spouse visas.
B. The Evidentiary Requirements to Prove a Domestic Violence Claim
For a foreign spouse to be granted a permanent visa based on
domestic violence, he or she must prove that that a "genuine and continuing
relationship," collapsed due to domestic violence perpetrated by their
Australian counterpart. Courts determine whether a relationship was
"genuine and continuing." However, because they lack the necessary
expertise, proof of whether domestic violence occurred is determined by
experts.
1. Establishing a "Genuine and Continuing Relationship"
The purpose of the two-year waiting period for permanent visas is for
DIMA to reassess whether the relationship with the foreign spouse is still in
existence. This reassessment attempts to eliminate fraudulent applications
that seek to deceive the immigration authorities. 30 In Australia, "marriage"
means "the union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others,
voluntarily entered into for life,",31 and includes de facto relationships. 32 The
"interdependent" category, for example, was created to accommodate same-
sex relationships.33 Regulation 1.09A, while requiring both partners to be at
least eighteen years old and "not within a prohibited degree of
23 Id. sched. 2, subclasses 309 (Spouse Provisio, applying from overseas) and 820 (Spouse
Provisional, applying on-shore).24 Id. subclasses 100, 801, and 820.
'5 1d. subclass 309.
26 Id. subclasses 110, 814, and 826.
27 Id. subclass 310.
28 Id. subclass 300.
29 Id. subclasses 801 and 820.
'0 Id. Reg. 1.15 (1 A)(b)(ii) (Austl.) (using the words "genuine and continuing").
31 Family Law Act, 1975, § 43(a) (Austl.).
32 Migration Regulation, 1994, Reg. 1.15A(1A)(2)(e) (Austl.) (requiring a 12-month cohabitation
period).
'3 Note the close relationship between the definitions of the terms "marriage," supra, note 31, and
"interdependent relationship," infra, note 35.
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relationship,"' 34 defines the term "interdependent relationship" in similar
terms as marriage, but with a slight change.35
Multiple procedures guide the application process.3 6  Generally, a
delegate of the Minister first hears permanent visa applications and makes a
decision. 37 To assess whether a relationship is "genuine and continuing" a
delegate asks questions on the background and development of the
relationship and the spouses' plans once married. 38 The delegates inquiry
includes questions related to where and how the applicant met their spouse,
frequency of communications, past living arrangements with the spouse,
personal gifts exchanged, and whether the applicant's family is aware of the
relationship and their reaction to it. Regarding future plans, the delegate
may inquire where the applicant plans to live in Australia, details regarding
the applicants prior relationships, whether the couple has prepared a will,
and what gifts the couple has received from family.
An aggrieved party may appeal to the Migration Review Tribunal39
("MRT"), which bases its decision on both the facts presented and
arguments the parties advance. The MRT may exercise two options. First,
the MRT may confirm the delegate's decision, effectively dismissing the
appeal. ° Second, the MRT may find for the applicant on pertinent points of
law, and remand the matter for the Minister's delegate to determine in
accordance with the terms of the finding.4' If the MRT's finding dissatisfies
any party, it may go to a single judge of the Federal Court,4 2 and then to a
34 Migration Regulation, 1994, Reg. 1.09A(3) (1994) (Austl.).
35 An "interdependent relationship" is defined as a relationship whereby two people, irrespective of
their sex, "have a mutual commitment to share life to the exclusion of any other spouse(s) ... or
interdependent.., partner(s)." Id. Reg. § 1.09A.
36 See Migration Act, 1975, §§ 65, 338, & 349; AUSTL. CONST. ch. Ill, § 75(v); Judiciary Act, 1903,
§§ 44 and 48B (Austl.).
37 Migration Act, 1975, § 65 and pt. 2, division 3AB (providing a code of procedures for dealing
fairly, efficiently and quickly with visa applications). Immigration officials will usually interview
applicants for spouse visas, but are not required to do so as a matter of law.
38 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [hereinafter DIMA]. Procedures Advice
Manual: Suggested Interview Questions for the Assessment of a Spouse/De Facto Relationship III (on file
with authror).
31 Migration Act 1958, § 338 (Austl.). Note the ability of the Minister to preclude review through
the issuance of a Conclusive Certificate. Id. § 339.
40 Id. § 349 (setting forth out the MRT's powers).
41 Id. The Migration Act demonstrates that the power to issue a visa vests on the Minister, or its duly
appointed delegate. Id.
42 This is so in spite of § 474 of the Migration Act, which states that decisions of the administrative
tribunals are final and not subject to review. See Plaintiff S 157/2002 v. Commonwealth of Australia
(2003) H.C.A. 2, WL 220455. Appeals now lie to a Federal Magistrate's Court or to the Full Federal
Court. See also Migration Act 1958, §§ 475A and 476 (Austl.).
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full Federal Court.43 The High Court is the final court for an appeal by a
dissatisfied party.44
Regulations 1.09A(2) and 1.15A(1) direct the use of a triple-tier test
to establish whether a relationship is durable. Spouses must first show that
"they have a mutual commitment to a shared life" 45 to the exclusion of all
others. They must also show that "the relationship between them is genuine
and continuing, ' '46 and that "they live together," not "separately and apart on
a permanent basis. ' 47 In short, spouses must show that the marriage is real
and that it was not contrived to deceive immigration authorities. Similar
conditions apply for de facto relationships.48 Generally, in cases where a
spouse withdraws his or her sponsorship or nomination, and their
counterpart applies for a permanent visa on domestic violence grounds, a
court or tribunal inquires whether the marriage was entered into voluntarily
and to the exclusion of all others.49
Doan v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs50 illustrates
this point. Mr. and Mrs. Doan were married in 1995.51 Mrs. Doan
nominated her husband for immigration. 52 He was subsequently granted a
spouse visa.53 Two years later, she withdrew her nomination claiming their
relationship had collapsed 4 When the matter went to the MRT, one of the
central questions considered was whether there was a genuine marriage
between them.55 The evidence revealed that Mr. and Mrs. Doan had met
only three times before getting married.56  The first time they met Mr.
Doan's friend introduced them to each other. Thereafter, Mrs. Doan
returned home while Mr. Doan spent the night at the friend's home.57 Mr.
4' For a description of judicial review by Australia's Federal courts, see JAMES CRAWFORD,
AUSTRALIAN COURTS O1 LAW (3d ed. 1993).
44 AUSTL. CONST., ch. III, § 75(v); Judiciary Act, 1903, §§ 20 and 35 (Austl.).
45 Migration Regulations, 1994, Reg. 1.09A(2)(c)(i) and 1.15A(2)(c)(i) (Austl.).
46 Id. Regs. 1.09A(2)(c)(ii) and 1.1 5A(2)(c)(ii).47 Id. Regs. 1.09A(2)(c)(iii)(A)-(B) and 1. 15A(2)(c)(iii).
48 Id. Reg. 1.15A(2).
49 See e.g., Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS
319; Nassouh v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 788, WL 1243386;
Leslie Alden Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453; and Colin Arend Damoze (2000) M.R.T.A. 1099. If one of
the reasons for entering into a marriage is to migrate or improve financial status, this does not mean that the
marriage is not genuine. See e.g., Dhillon v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs
(1994) 48 F.C.R. 107.
so (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319.
5 M. at "12.
52 Id. at *12, *13.
Sld. at *13.
54 id.
" Id. at *14.
56 Id. at *15.
" Id. at *15, *16.
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and Mrs. Doan's second meeting was two weeks later when they spent two
days together. 58 They got married on their third meeting.
5 9
Mr. Doan's evidence was quite contradictory, suffering from
fundamental internal flaws and inconsistencies regarding their marriage and
the preceding period. More important, he was unable to satisfactorily
answer basic questions ordinarily expected of a spouse. For instance, he
could not recall the exact wedding date, telling the MRT that it was on
January 14, 1995, a date that was inconsistent with the January 5, 1995 date
on the wedding photos.60 Nor was he able to state where Mrs. Doan lived
despite an earlier claim that he moved in with her two days before the
wedding and then lived at that address for at least two months after the
wedding. 6' From these facts alone, it is apparent why the MRT described
Mr. Doan as "a most devious person who would not deliver a direct answer
to questions, 62 and concluded that the purported marriage was a "sham, the
result of conspiracy by Mr. Doan and [Mrs. Doan] to deceive the
authorities., 63 On appeal, Judge Lindgren, in the Federal Court, affirmed the
MRT's decision.
64
2. "Domestic Violence, " Admissible Evidence and the Role of Experts
Proving a domestic violence claim requires an individual to adduce
two statutory declarations from experts, or competent persons. For the
purposes of this Article, however, it remains important to analyze the
definition of "domestic violence," which to date has not been substantively
defined by legislation. The Federal Court has not offered much guidance in
this regard and still remains divided on whether it can be extended beyond
physical violence.
a. "Domestic Violence"
A non-Australian spouse or partner may obtain a permanent visa
before the expiration of the two-year waiting period if he or she can
" Id. at *16.
59 Id.
6o Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at *15.
63 Id. at *22.
64 It might be of interest to contrast this case with the following MRT decisions where the Tribunal
made adverse credibility findings, but based on domestic violence, still approved the case: Olivera Malek
(2001) M.R.T.A. 247; Kidest Asrate Adera (2000) M.R.T.A. 3155; Miran Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244;
Ruth Suzanne Coad (2001) M.R.T.A. 943.
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demonstrate that his or her Australian spouse or partner abused them.65
Practically, what the abused spouse or partner must prove is that the
marriage collapsed primarily because of the domestic violence. An
applicant trying to utilize the domestic violence exception must show that
the nominator or sponsor is the perpetrator of the violence.66 Otherwise, the
permanent visa application might fail.
67
Division 1.5 of the Act 68 outlines the substantive provisions regarding
domestic violence in immigration. Notwithstanding the fundamental role
Division 1.5 plays, and its repeated use of the term "domestic violence," one
of its shortfalls is its failure to concretely define this term. Problems aside,
this Division does three things. First, Regulation 1.21(1) simply defines the
term "violence" to include "a threat of violence," which is not very helpful.
Second, and perhaps more helpfully, Regulation 1.23(2)(b) provides some
guidance by importing a mental element.69 This Regulation concentrates on
the likely subjective effects on a victim, formulating domestic violence as an
act "that causes [a victim] to fear for, or . . . be apprehensive about, [his or
her] personal well-being or safety." Third, the Division gives direction
regarding the kind of evidence required to prove a domestic violence
claim. v
Several sources, including legal dictionaries, related legislation, and
judicial precedents, may be consulted to fill the statute's definitional gaps.
The Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, for example, defines
domestic violence as, "violence committed in or pertaining to a person's
65 Migration Regulations, 1994, sched. 2, subclasses 100.221(4)(c)(i), 110.221(l)(4)(c),
801.221(6)(c)(i), 814.221(8)(c), 820.221(3)(b)(i), 826.221(4)(b), and 831.221(4)(c)(i) (Austi.).66 For instance, in Malik v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.R. 291,
Judge Wilcox stated:
[T]here is no suggestion of the wife having engaged in a course of conduct of
intimidation, belittling, frightening or similar conduct towards the husband. There seem
to be matrimonial differences, and then a break up of the marriage in the context of an
accusation about bigamy. There is no suggestion of the applicant having been caused to
suffer fear or apprehension.
Id. Similarly, Doan's case collapsed because, according to Judge Lindgren "[T]here was no suggestion that
Mr. Doan had been assaulted. The case presented by Mr. Doan was that he was humiliated by his wife's
continuing adultery in the home where he was living and that it caused the marital relationship to end."
Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319.
67 See Malik, (2000) F.C.R. 291, and Doan, (2000) F.C.A. 909.
68 Migration Regulations, 1994, Regs. 1.21-1.30 (Austl.).
69 This Regulation focuses on the effect of the violence upon the victim's mind. The Regulation
requires the act to cause the alleged victim to "fear for or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim's
personal well-being or safety." Id. Reg. 1.23(2)(b) (emphasis added).
70 Id. Regs. 1.21-1.30.
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situation.,, 71  This comes close to the criminal law perspective, which whilst
stretching this dictionary definition, sees domestic violence as a "personal
violence committed against a relative, spouse, or de facto spouse of the
offender, a person who has or has had an intimate personal relationship with
the offender, or a person living in the same household as the offender, but
not merely as tenant or boarder.,
7 2
Traditionally, domestic violence claimants (mostly women) were
required to prove they had suffered physical abuse at the hands of a
perpetrator (predominantly male spouses).7 3 In the absence of this physical
element, claims would fail. However, this is not the case any more. Gender
roles have switched, making it possible for both women and men to be
perpetrators as well as victims of domestic violence. This renders untenable
the conventional idea portraying men as perpetrators of domestic violence
and women as victims. 7 4 Further, the domestic violence threshold is not
confined to instances of physical abuse, but now also includes non-physical
abuse.75
Leslie Alden Reggie 76 is an example of such a case. Reggie's wife
abandoned her matrimonial home after admitting an infidelity and
subsequently withdrew the sponsorship of her husband, who then applied for
a permanent visa on domestic violence grounds. 77 As husband and wife, he
submitted, they had engaged in unprotected sexual relations. 78 Her
admission of infidelity, combined with the discovery that the men she had
slept with "had a reputation [for] promiscuity,"' 79 caused him to fear
71 BUTTERWORTHS CONCISE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY 136 (2d ed. 2002).
72 See e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 4 (Austl.), and Crimes (Family Violence) Act, 1987, §§ 3(1) and
4(1) (Austl.). See also Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act, 1989, § I1(1) (Austl.); and Domestic
Violence Act, 1986, § 4A (Austl.), which state that any of the following acts, committed against a spouse,
constitute domestic violence: physical injury, damage to property, threats, or harassment.
13 For the evolution of domestic violence legislation in Australia, see RENATA ALEXANI)ER,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA: TIlE LEGAL RESPONSE (3d ed. 2002).
74 The following cases are examples of how men have succeeded on claims based on domestic
violence: Leslie Alden Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453; Meroka v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (2002) F.C.R. 251; Miran Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244. See generally PHILIP W.
CGOK, ABUSED iMEN: TIlL HIDDEN SE oF DO,,ESTIC VIOLENCE (1997).
's See e.g., Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453; and Meroka (2002) F.C.R. 251, where male applicants
claimed they suffered psychological and emotional violence from their female partners. See also
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCACY CENTRE, OUR DREAM . . . STOPPING TIlE VIOLENCE 5-9 (1999) and
FAMILY VIOLENCE PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TASK FORCE, FAMILY VIOLENCE: EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS,
SOMEBODY'S LIFE 62-64 (1991) (cataloguing the following as constituting domestic violence: emotional
and or psychological abuse, economical abuse, spiritual abuse, stalking, threats of violence, financial abuse,
social intimidation and harassment).
7' (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453.
I Id. at 8.
78 Id. at 5-6.
9 Id. at 5.
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contracting a sexually transmitted disease, which subsequently led to
emotional and psychological distress.80 Two experts, a clinical psychologist
and general medical practitioner corroborated his evidence. 8' The MRT
expounded the meaning of domestic violence by cataloging examples of
82how domestic violence can be perpetrated. In the words of the Member:
"Domestic violence is an abuse of power. It is the [course of conduct of]
domination, coercion, intimidation ... victimization, [belittling, frightening
or similar conduct] of one person by another by physical, sexual or
emotional means within intimate relationships.,
83
A more authoritative view comes from the Federal Court in Malik v.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs.84 In Malik the nominated
spouse applied for a permanent visa after his marriage collapsed.85 Judge
Wilcox, after acknowledging the Regulations' failure to define the term
"domestic violence", argued that "it is reasonable to accept that the term
may cover cases where the damage suffered by an applicant is not
physical. 86
More significantly, Judge Wilcox drew from Division 1.5, coining a
hybrid definition of the term "domestic violence":
"Domestic violence" is conduct against the victim, usually a
course of conduct, that causes the victim to have fear or
apprehension about her or his personal well-being or safety. It
is not sufficient that there be a conduct which has had the effect
of causing diminution of a person's feeling of well-being.
There must be conduct, of one party towards the other, which
87has the consequence of causing fear or apprehension.
This view has been subsequently affirmed.88 It is also important to realize
that by focusing on the victim, and thus setting a subjective test, 89 Judge
Wilcox was reiterating Regulation 1.23(2)(b).9"
so Id.
81 Id.
12 Id. at 14.
83 id.
14 (2000) F.C.R. 291.
I /d. at 1.
S/d. at 3.
87 id.
8' See e.g., Reggie, (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453; Olivera Malek (2001) M.R.T.A. 247; Meroka v. Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 F.C.R. 251.
89 The question courts ask is whether a "victim" has become fearful or apprehensive because of the
violence committed.
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However, not all Federal Court judges have taken such a broad view.
Some have opted for a narrower view requiring the physical violence
element to prove a domestic violence claim. 9' In Doan, Judge Lindgren
argued in disposing of the application:
It is true that the words "domestic violence," as they occur in
the letter ... from [Mr. Doan's solicitors] to the MRT, but in
view of the fact that the Mr Doan's statement did not refer to
any physical violence, I think the MRT was entitled to treat the
expression "domestic violence" . . . as referring to a sustained
emotional affront done to their client by the Nominator. This
construction is consistent with other material placed before the
MRT on behalf of Mr. Doan by his solicitors that referred to
"torture and humiliation" material, "agony" and "sadistic plan"
in contexts which are clearly attempts to express indignation
over the treatment that Doan received, rather than physical
violence.92
These decisions, from a single Federal Court judge, thus leave the issue
unsettled, until a Full Federal Court or High Court resolves it. I express
further sentiments on the issue in Part IV.
b. Evidence, Experts and Expert Evidence
Pursuant to the Regulations, a victim's evidence, oral and
documentary, is per se insufficient to prove a domestic violence claim.
93
Evidence must be corroborated by the oral testimony and statutory
declaration 94 of at least two experts. 95 While the Regulations refer to these
experts as "competent persons," a complete "evidence dossier" should
90 According to this regulation, "relevant domestic violence" is "violence committed against the
alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim or a member of [his or her] family, to
fear for, or to be apprehensive about, [his or her] personal well-being or safety." Migration Regulations,
1994, Reg. 1.23(2)(b) (Austl.).
" See e.g., Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS
319.
92 Id. at *12.
93 Regulation 1.25 requires a statutory declaration to be adduced by an alleged victim, or a person
alleging that another person has suffered domestic violence. Migration Regulations, 1994, Reg. 1.25
(Austl.). Subsections (2) and (3) outline the contents of a statutory declaration, including full names and
relationship between the victim and perpetrator, the allegation, and supporting evidence. Id.
94 Regulation 1.24(l)(a)(ii) prescribes other alternative forms of secondary documentary evidence:
court orders and police records. Id.
9' Id. Reg. 1.24(I)(b).
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contain three statutory declarations: one drawn by the victim and two by
96competent persons. A victim may also be required to submit "a copy of a
record of the alleged assault[s] committed" on their person or property97 by
the perpetrator. There is a further requirement that the record should be "a
record kept by a police service"98 in their ordinary course of business. This
seeks to guard against doctored police records.
c. Defining "Competent Persons"
Regulation 1.21(1)(a) and (b) specify two situations in which a
competent person may be called upon to adduce evidence: where the victim
is a child" and where the victim is an adult. 00 The same persons who are
eligible to adduce evidence under the adult category qualify equally in cases
where the victim is a child.101 However, the child category goes a step
further in introducing "an officer of the child welfare or child protection
authorities" as an optional expert.10 2 Both situations draw their competent
persons from medical and social welfare fields, which suggests that domestic
violence victims require some medical and/or social welfare assistance and
expertise, not only to prove their claims, but also to get them back on track.
For both classes Regulation 1.21(1)(a) and (b) provide five categories of
persons who are competent: registered medical practitioners, psychologists,
nurses, social workers, and court counselors. Further, Regulation, 1.21(2)
provides for an additional "competent officer", for example:
(a) manager or coordinator of:
(i) a women's refuge; or
(ii) a crisis and counseling service that specializes in
domestic violence; or
(b) a position with:
(i) a decision-making responsibility for:
(A) a women's refuge; or
96 id.
97 Regulation 1.23(2)(b) divides the objects of domestic violence into two categories: the alleged
victim and his or her property.
9' Id. Reg. 1.24.
99 Id. Reg. 1.21(1)(b)(i) and (ii). In Australia, a person below sixteen years of age is a chold or a
minor for many legal purposes. See e.g., Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act, 1998, § 3(Austl.); Child Protection Act, 1974, § 2 (Austl.); and Children and Young Persons Act, 1989, § 3 (Austl.).
:00 Migration Regulations, 1994, Reg. 1.21 (1)(a)(i)-(vi).
0o Id. Reg. 1.21(l)(b)(i) (stating that "a person referred to in [Regulation 1.21 (1)](a)" is a competent
person in relation to "domestic violence committed against a child").
02 Id. Reg. 1.21(l)(b)(ii).
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(B) a crisis and counseling service that specializes in
domestic violence that has a collective decision-making
structure; and
(ii) responsibility for matters concerning domestic violence
within the operations of that refuge or crisis and
counseling service.
d. Tendering "Competent" Evidence
Under the Regulations, the accepted mode of tendering expert
evidence is through statutory declaration. '03 Generally, statutory
declarations are in writing and involve the declarer swearing that the stated
information is correct to the best of his/her knowledge and truly represents
the facts.104 Since proving a domestic violence claim requires at least three
witnesses, it follows that at any one time there will be three statutory
declarations: one from the victim and two others from competent persons.
The victim or a "person who alleges that another is the victim of relevant
domestic violence," 10 5 may make a "victim" declaration. 106 This differs
from a "competent person" declaration, which cannot be delegated to a third
party. 10 7 Notwithstanding this distinction, statutory declarations are similar
in content-they must name the alleged perpetrator, set out the allegation,
and outline the evidence on which it is based.10 8 Further, Regulation 1.25(3)
recognizes that in certain instances a victim, for one reason or another,
intentionally or otherwise, is unable to swear to a statutory declaration.' 0 9
Consequently, persons who make "delegated" declarations should not only
state their full names, but also specify the existing relationship between
themselves and the victim. 10 Reasons for one's inability to make a
declaration range from age (minors to very old persons) and health, to
cultural beliefs and values that consider domestic violence a private issue
:03 Id. Reg. 1.24(1).
104 See Greech v. Bird (1936) 56 C.L.R. 228, 243-44. See also Statutory Declarations Act, 1959, § 8
(Austl .
A Migration Regulations, 1994, Reg. 1.25(3).
106 Id. Reg. 1.25(1).
107 Id. Reg. 1.26 (stating that such a Statutory Regulation "must be made by a competent person")
(emphasis added).
0' Id. Regs. 1.25(3) and 1.26.
109 Thus, the Regulation permits "Statutory Declarations .. .made by a person who alleges that
another person is the victim of relevant domestic violence," Id. Reg. 1.25(3).
t.o Id. Reg. 1.25(3)(a) and (c).
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that should not be publicly exposed."' For such cases, a third party may
swear a declaration on behalf of the victim.
Considering the nature of domestic violence, victims would ordinarily
be comfortable sharing their experience with a close friend or relative, rather
than a complete stranger. This assumption may indicate that declarations
made by persons who do not have a close relationship with the victim are
less likely to be admitted in evidence. As for statutory declarations made by
competent persons, in addition to the normal requirements, Regulation
1.26(c) requires that a competent person "must state that, in [his or her]
opinion," the alleged victim suffered domestic violence. To date, the
Federal Court remains split on whether failure to state that the person
suffered domestic violence annuls a statutory declaration. 12
lII. ANALYSIS: SOME "GAPS" IN THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The current legal framework suffers from at least five shortcomings.
First, the Migration Act and its Regulations have failed to concretely define
"domestic violence." Although the Federal Court is divided on whether
physical violence must be present to prove a domestic claim, it has
nonetheless created a working definition. Secondly, MRT members and
federal court judges have remained insensitive to cultural practices that
condone what would otherwise amount to domestic violence. This is
especially true with spouses who come from African and Asian countries.
Overall, such failure might prejudice an individual's case. Related to the
cultural argument is the third shortcoming, which are the day to day realities
for immigrant spouses. Normally immigrants rely on their spouses for
economic, social and emotional support. Thus, when an individual falls into
the hands of an abusive spouse they might not know where to file a
complaint. Fourth, notwithstanding the puzzle that immigration law is by
itself, some courts and immigration tribunals have pursued procedure at the
expense of substance. Finally, the law puts fiancres in the awkward position
of stating that any abuse suffered before the marriage is insufficient to
trigger the domestic violence provisions.
.. Bozic, for instance, testified that he was "ashamed to ask for help or tell people of the" suffering
he had undergone. Miran Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244, at 4. Similarly, Doan, despite having found his wife
in the midst of adultery, was reluctant to discuss the event with anyone, instead seeing it as a "private
problem." Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319, at
*12.
112 See discussion infra Part IV(d).
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A. Defining "Domestic Violence"
The discussion above focused on the definition of "domestic
violence" through the prism of immigration law. Regulation 1.21 (1) defines
the word "violence" in simple inclusive terms to "include a threat of
violence." Although this description might not appear very helpful on its
face, it is prudent to consider that perhaps the legislature intended the word
"violence" to have the same meaning it has in ordinary usage. So for
immigration purposes, it is not only in instances of actual violence that the
Regulations apply, but threats of violence may also trigger application of the
Regulations as well. Be that as it may, Regulation 1.23(2)(b) deserves
mention when discussing definitions. Sub regulation 2 is an explanatory
note to sub regulation (1)(g), describing one of the instances when a person
is determined to have suffered domestic violence. Of central importance is
Paragraph 2(b), defining "relevant domestic violence." However, this
paragraph is not contained within the general interpretation provisions,
which raises questions about whether it is intended to play a broad
definitional role.113 If the legislature so intended, then it would have been
better to place it under the "interpretation" section of Division 
1.5.' 14
"[R]elevant domestic violence" is defined as "violence against the
alleged victim or his or her property that causes [him or her], or a member of
the victim's family to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the victim's
personal well-being or safety." ' 15 Three issues arise from this descriptive
definition. First. by putting a victim's property on par with his or her life,
the Regulations recognize the important role property plays in human life.
Since we live in a capitalistic world, there are certain instances where
victims may suffer equally from threats or acts of violence committed
against their property, real and personal, as they would if their lives were
targeted. Similarly, the Regulation references members of a victim's family.
This derives from the assumption that threats or actual violence against a
family member would have the same impact as if the victim him/herself
were personally targeted. Finally, the Regulation prescribes a subjective test
to be used in determining whether or not domestic violence has occurred."
16
1'3 In this case, Regulation 1.21 of the Migration Regulations, titled "Interpretation," is the
Interpretation part of provisions relating to domestic violence. Migration Regulations, 1994, Reg. 1.21
(Austl.). Defined under it are the following terms: competent person, statutory declaration and violence.Id.
I. 114 ld.
I' Id. Reg. 1.25(2)(b).
16 It is important to bear in mind that this evidence needs to be corroborated by at least two
competent persons, who must conclude-on probative evidence-that domestic violence has occurred,
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The focus is on the alleged victim or a member of his or her family. The
central question to be asked is: did the actual violence, or threats, cause the
victim or a member of his or her family to be fearful or apprehensive about
his or her personal life, well-being, safety and/or property?
Regulation 1.23(l)(b) requires that "another person (the alleged
perpetrator)" personally cause threats or violence to the alleged victim. This
provision may be interpreted in a restrictive or liberal way. Under a
restrictive approach, the perpetrator must act in person or this provision does
not apply. On one hand, liberal critics might argue that the act of the agent
who is directed to commit the violent act is attributed to the principal, as
long as the principal/agent relationship can be established." 7 For practical
purposes, the liberal view makes more sense.' 18 Otherwise, Immigration
Law would be much harsher than other areas of law. Courts and
immigration tribunals should take the broader view if this issue becomes the
subject of litigation.
As mentioned before, the Federal Court is divided on whether
physical violence is a necessary component in a domestic violence claim.
Notwithstanding this, judges such as Judge Wilcox in Malik, 119 have
attempted to formulate an appropriate working definition of "domestic
violence" as "[a course of] conduct against the victim, . . . that causes [him
or her] to have fear or apprehension about her or his personal well-being or
safety."'12
Similarly, Tribunal Member Butt in Reggie, after defining domestic
violence simply as "an abuse of power," described the term to mean "[the
course of conduct of] domination, coercion, intimidation and victimisation
of one person by another by physical, sexual or emotional means within
intimate relationships."' 21
effectively importing objectivity into the test. See also Meroka v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 F.C.R. 251.
117 A principal-agent relationship is a relationship involving authority or capacity in one person (the
agent) to create or affect legal relations between another person (the principal) and third parties. Int'l
Harvester Co. of Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral Co. (1958) 100 C.L.R. 644. The
relationship is created either by the express or implied agreement of principal and agent, by the subsequent
ratification by the principal of the agent's acts done on behalf of the principal, by operation of law,
pursuant to statute, or by estoppel under the doctrine apparent (or ostensible) authority. See
BUTTERWORTHS CONCISE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY, supra note 71, at 17.
' See also Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act, 1989, § 11(2) (Austl.) (recognizing this
reality, by stating that in claims of domestic violence "a spouse need not personally commit the act or
threaten to commit it").
119 Malik v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.R. 291.121 Id. at 3.
121 Leslie Alden Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453, at 14.
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B. Conflicting Cultural Values and Beliefs
In African122 and Asian123 cultures, wife beating or chastising remains
an accepted practice. In Africa, for instance, men dominate the
household. 124  They cannot be challenged or questioned.125  Women are
122 NAWAL EL SAADAWI, WOMEN AT POINT ZERO (1994) is a story about Firdaus, a woman the
Egyptian female author met in prison. Firdaus describes the suffering she underwent in the hands of her
husband:
On one occasion [my husband] hit me all over with his shoe. My face and body
became swollen and all bruised. So I left the house and went to my uncle. But my uncle
told me that all husbands beat their wives, and my uncle's wife added that her husband
often beat her. I said my husband was a respected Sheikh, could not possibly be in the
habit of beating his wife. She replied that it is men well versed with religion who beat up
their wives. The precepts of religion permitted such punishment. A virtuous woman was
not supposed to complain about her husband.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). See ADEOLA JAMES, IN THEIR OWN VOICES: AFRICAN WOMEN WRITERS TALK
(Adeola James ed., 1991), for a compilation of interviews between the Editor and selected African women
writers. In an interview with Buchi Emecheta, a prolific female Nigerian Writer, Emecheta, argues: "The
good woman, in Achebe's portrayal, is the one who kneels down and drinks the dregs after her husband. In
the Arrow if God when the husband is beating the wife, the other women stand around saying, 'It's enough,
it's enough."' Id. at 42.
123 See AMINA MAMA, THE HIDDEN STRUGGLE: STATUTORY AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR RESPONSES TO
VIOiEINCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN IN THE HOME 63-64 (1989). At Amina Mama's interview with
Sangita, a 22-year old Asian woman married and living with her husband in Britain, Sangita describes her
husband's character three months after they were married:
He used to kick me, punch me-he used to throw me about the room. He used to
pull my hair to pieces.... No broken bones, but I've had black eyes and I've got scars,
loads of scars to prove, because he used to have quite long nails-he'd just grab hold of
me and the skin would sort of come away .... When I refused to have sex with him, he'd
say to me-Are you sleeping with another person? You must be. He was so suspicious.
He'd often say to me-You must be sleeping with other men. And he'd sort of force
himself on me.... Yes, it was very painful.
Id. Smita, a Pakistani, describes the violence she underwent in the hands of her Pakistani husband, to
include:
Kicking, pushing, threats of using a knife. He pushed me against the radiator
once-he would push me against hard objects. Punching and kicking. I actually ran out
of the house and my nose was bleeding.... When I was six months pregnant he pushed
me down the stairs. And then he wasn't around when I'd had the baby. There was no
caring in him at all; there was no love, there was no care.
Id. at 65.
124 MAMA, supra note 123, at 81. At Mama's interview conducted with lyarnide, Iyamide claims the
following of the African male: "You know African men-they think you are a slave. Especially when they
are older than you. They want to make their power over you." Id. Patience, a Nigerian, describes her
plight, in the hands of her African husband:
Last Easter he took me and stripped me in front of his friends. He was beating me,
punching me and pushing me about. I had come in from the kitchen because I heard him
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considered subordinate to their husbands. 126 Any attempt to defy the
husband's authority is punished, 27 while any kind of reliance on a woman
saying some nasty things in front of his friends trying to be funny by making fun of me.
So I came out from the kitchen and I told him he would regret the things he was doing.
As I was going out he started rough-handling me-shouting and pushing me. As he was
doing all that my zip had come down, and my breast was coming out-I didn't even
notice-I was busy trying to restrain things so as not to display anything to those people.
He started slapping my breast and shouting "Cover yourself." All in front of his friend
and the wife, while they were looking on.
Id. at 83. Zubeda Dangor describes the traditional status of women in Africa:
Men are perceived as the head of the household: "Society gives power and
condones their behavior and our parents encourage men to be superiors." Women are
taught to be submissive to males. A woman "has to always please her man. Her role is
that of mother and wife only. The man is given more decision-making responsibilities."
Zubeda Dangor et al., 4 WOMEN ABUSEi iN SOUTH AFRICA: AN EXPLANATORY STUDY 6 (1998).25 See Saud Ibrahim Abdi, Religious and Cultural Laws Used to Deny Women Their Rights, in
HEINRICH BOELL FOUNDATION, GENDER GAPS IN OUR CONSTITUTIONS: WOMEN'S CONCERNS IN SELECTrED
AFRICAN COUNTRIES (2002). Abdi quotes Suzanne Jambo, of the New Sudanese Indigenous NGOs
Network, affirming that: "[a Southern Sudanese woman] is a wife for whom dowry/bride price was paid
and therefore who has no voice in her matrimonial home. She is a silent partner that endures so much
without complaints for divorce is a taboo." Id. at 61.126 See JAMES, supra note 122, at 29 (discussing an interview with Zaynab Alkali, a Nigerian female
author and University Lecturer). Paradoxically, Alkali attributes her inspiration for writing to: "[Tihe
general attitude of the society towards the female, commonly referred to as the 'weaker sex.' I am irked by
the fact that most women have been trained to see themselves as 'weak' and 'incapable' of attaining the
highest peak of intellectual development." See also JAMES, supra note 122, at 35-36 (discussing an
interview with a prolific female Nigerian Writer, Emcheta). Emcheta argues:
[H]alf of my novels the problem rests with the women. They are so busy bitching
about one another, they even say the women are acting just as is expected. But when you
deal with foreign women ... all you have is to give a talk and they appreciate you and
express solidarity with you. But it isn't so in our own country. The usual reaction "So
she has written a book? I know who did it for her, [her husband]."
Id. Similarly, at an interview with Ellen Kuzwayo a South African writer, Kuzwayo explains the plight of
an African woman:
I have every reason to believe that every woman, every black woman, particularly
in Africa, is fully aware of [the double ill fate suffered by a black South African woman].
... We've always been stereotyped and I think it is this stereotyping that had given the
black woman an extra burden, as a black and as a woman.
Id. at 55. Finally, at an interview with Asenath Odago, a Kenyan play wright, Odago admits:
I am fortunate,... that when I got married my husband never tried to put me down,
he always allowed me [to put my best effort forward in everything I did]. I say 'allowed'
because in our society if a husband is against your progress you cannot get anywhere to
develop as a person.
Id. at 124.
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equals "wife control," which is equated with weakness.12 8 Notwithstanding
westernized influences, these cultural practices still exist. 129 What may
otherwise appear to be domestic violence in the eyes of the westernized
world, remains an "internal matter."'1 30 Such matters are only exposed in
extreme cases, for instance, where life or limb is threatened. Even then, only
adult male members of the extended family are eligible to adjudicate them.
Discussing such matters with outsiders is considered taboo.131
Since these cultural values and beliefs are not easy to shed, foreign
spouses often carry them into their marriages and interpersonal relationship
with Australians. 132 Precedents such as Reggie, Doan, Meroka, Kaur
Manjeet133 and Bozic demonstrate how cultural practices and beliefs prohibit
the reporting of acts that would otherwise be considered "domestic
127 Dangor, supra note 124, at 4 (arguing that: "[African] men who abuse their partners design and
implement power and control tactics over their victims with the intention of keeping them in their place
(i.e., the traditionally subordinate position of wives in the institution of marriage... )").
.2 In South Sudanese Communities, "[a]uthority, decision making and control is in the hands of the
man as being the father and . . . head of the family." Abdi, supra note 125, at 64. See also MINEKF
SCIIPPER, SOURCE OF ALL EVIL: AFRICAN PROVERBS AND SAYINGS ON WOMEN (1991), at 86-90 (quoting
some African proverbs depicting male-female power play in African families). For instance, "Woman's
intelligence is like that of a child." (Benin, Senegal, West Africa); "A woman and an invalid man are the
same thing." (Gikuyu, Kenya); "A woman is like a goat: she is tethered where the thistles grow." (Rwanda,
Rwanda); "If a man is not obeyed by his wife, he must beat her thwack!" (Swahili, East Africa); "The
arrogant woman is controlled by strokes." (Rundi, Burundi; Rwanda, Rwanda); "Women have no mouth."
(Beti, Cameroon); "No woman is called upon to speak." (Rwanda, Rwanda); "A woman in trousers? What
is dangling inside?" (Fon, Benin); "A wife is a piece of cloth; beat it and cover it at the same time."
(Mongo, Zaire); "Never marry a woman with bigger feet that your own." (Sena, Malawi/Mozambique);
"Only a shameful woman takes her husband to court." (Ganda, Uganda); "Beat your wife regularly; if you
don't know why, she will." (West Africa, possibly of Arab origin). Id.
"9 For an excellent discussion of instances where culture prohibits immigrants from reporting
instances of what would otherwise constitute domestic violence, see Jae Yop Kim & Ky-taik Sung,
Conjugal Violence in Korean American Families. A Residue of the Cultural Tradition 15 J. OF FAMIILY
VIOLENCE 331 (2000) (focusing on Korean American families); and Rhea V. Almeida & Ken Dolan-
Delvecchio, Addressing Culture in Batterers Intervention. The Asian Indian Community As An Illustrative
Example, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 654 (1999).
"0 Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909; Leslie Alden
Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453; and Miran Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244.
31 Abdi, supra note 125, at 54, puts the picture in perspective:
It is considered taboo [in Somaliland] to discuss family matters outside the house
and only family members get involved in solving disputes that arise between husband and
wife. On the other hand, society believes that the husband has a right to discipline his
wife and domestic violence is seen as a disciplinary act, and not an abuse. There are
hardly any cases taken to court.
(Emphasis added)
132 See e.g., Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453; Doan, (2000) F.C.A. 909; Meroka, (2002) 117 F.C.R.
251; Kaur Manjeet (2001) M.R.T.A. 2657; and Bozic, (2002) M.R.T.A. 244.
' (2001) M.R.T.A. 2657.
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violence". In Kaur, for instance, the visa applicant, an Indian national,
stated in testimony that:
[W]hen she spoke with her friends and family in native
language, [the Australia permanent resident husband] got upset,
started banging doors and ... throwing things. [H]e would not
discuss their problems. [T]he sponsor left their house in March
1999 and she went after him because she was afraid of the
breakdown of [her second] marriage, [which] her family had
objected to . . . because of the racial, religious and cultural
differences. [S]he married the sponsor because she thought that
he would have been open-minded and would take her first son
as his own. [S]he did not go to domestic violence and other
agencies for assistance as they were strangers. [H]er cultural
background inhibited her in taking formal action against the
sponsor as she considered this would be disloyal and she
wanted try to make her marriage work. 34
Two other witnesses who testified, Mr. Guishan Bedi (the applicant's
brother) and Ms. Sunani Gupta (a friend) corroborated this evidence. 3 5
Reporting her husband's behavior, according to Mr. Bedi, would be
considered "culturally inappropriate,"' 136 while Ms. Gupta described it as
"inimical to Indian culture.' 37 Similar situations are replicated in Reggie' 3
8
and Bozic.' 39 In Reggie the visa applicant, a Malaysian national, did not
seek external assistance because of the "humiliation and shame"'140 he would
otherwise have suffered.' 4' Bozic admitted that he was "ashamed to ask for
help or tell people"'' 42 of the abuse he suffered from his wife.
43
The Doan144 and Meroka145 cases also emphasize this phenomenon.
In Meroka the visa applicant, a Kenyan national formerly married to an
Australian citizen, explained his plight as:
114 Id. at 4.
135 id.
136 Id. at 5.
137 id.
:38 Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453.
139 Miran Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244.
4o Reggie, (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453, at 14.
141 Id. According to the general medical practitioner who examined him, Dr. White: "[Reggie]
consulted him on 13 September 2001 and stated that 'he has had a fear of having contracted a sexually
transmitted disease but humiliation and shame prevented him from seeking any assistance ..... Id.
142 Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244, at 4.
143 id.
1' Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319.
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continuously being harassed, constantly being yelled at &
derogative statements given--e.g. you black bastard "you're
lucky to have married me," social isolation-turning the phone
off, unable to speak to colleagues, work [mates] or university
lecturers, removing items, time restrictions example time given
hours documented on white board placing hours, if he was late
would be questioned where have you been were you talking to
women etc. monitoring where about requiring to explain
himself every minute of the day, continuously questioning do
you need that, no you don't . :. get out of the kitchen, I'll cook,
I'm not eating that, did you have TV in Kenya-your watching
this, . . .you will attend [this] function, I will tell you who is
suitable for you to speak to, your job-open the car doors,
working a double shift [and] driving [me] home as stated its
your job .... 146
Indeed the humiliation and shame resulting from such words makes it
quite difficult to come out to seek assistance, even from fellow Africans.
Likewise, Mr. Doan, a Vietnam Citizen, despite having found his wife in the
midst of adultery, was reluctant to discuss the event with anyone. 147 Instead,
he saw it as a "private problem"14
8 that ought to be solved domestically.,
49
145 Meroka v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 F.C.R. 251.
t' Id. at 7.
t47 Doan, (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319, at *12. After finding his wife in the midst of adultery, Mr.
Doan states:
When I was calm down I understood that I could not make a murder, so I did not do
anything because of the conscience of man. But who could think for my circumstance at
that time. What should I do? Calling the police to do what? I knew that it was our
private problem. So I did not do anything but I asked my wife why she did like that. She
kept quiet.
"d'
148 Id.
'49 Mr. Doan further testified:
I knew that it was our private problem. So I did not do anything but I asked my
wife why she did like that. She kept quiet.... For two weeks I tried to stay in the house,
I was hoping she would wake up and save our marriage. But she just did not care about
me at all.
Id. Similarly, Mrs. Kaur testified that she did not go to domestic violence or other like agencies for
assistance because they were "strangers." Kaur Manjeet (2001) M.R.T.A. 2657, at *6. Her desire was to
make the marriage "work." Id.
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Not until his wife kicked him out of their matrimonial house and he was in
need of a place to stay was he forced to explain the circumstances to his best
friend. 5 0
Although in all the cases, save for Doan where the applicants
succeeded on the respective points of law they raised, failure to report
instances of abuse is likely to prejudice a victim's case.' 5' If a spouse was
really abused, why did he or she not report it immediately? This is precisely
the question a culturally insensitive decision-maker would pose. This form
of questioning disregards cultural barriers and beliefs. To avoid occasioning
injustice, judicial practice requires judges and tribunal members to be
sensitive to these factors when writing decisions. While it is a futile to
catalogue these many cultural values and beliefs, courts and tribunals need
to be made aware of and consider this evidence as a starting point.
C. The Effects of Fear of a Foreign Land and the General Lack of
Information on Domestic Violence Claims
Cultural barriers are augmented by a non-Australian spouse's fear of
being in a foreign land.152 Immigrating to a foreign country is not an easy
task. After separation from the family comfort zone, an immigrant may be
required to change his or her life substantially and adopt a new one.
Changes include making new friends, learning a new language and
mannerisms, and adapting to the food, transport system, and weather, among
other things. 53 Adapting to life in Australia as an immigrant spouse has
recently become more complicated because anti-immigrant sentiment has
become more pervasive. 54 Africa, in contrast, has an "open door and open
15o Mr. Doan testifying that "she [Mrs. Doan] throw my clothing out of my room and told me to go."
Doan (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319, at *20.
151 E.g., id.
152 See infra and accompany text to note 153.
's3 Uma Narayan, "Male-Order" Brides: Immigrant Women, Domestic Violence, and.Immigration
Law, in PATRICE DIQUINZO & IRIS MARION YOUNG, FEMINIST ETICS AND SOCIAL POLICY 143 (Patrice
Diquinzo & Marion Young eds., 1997) concurs:
The experience of immigration is often a difficult one for both men and women,
involving moving great distances from the familiar contexts of one's homeland to the
rigors of life in a foreign country, wherc they face not only the disempowering
familiarities of the new context, but also prejudice and discrimination.
54 Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs (2001) F.C.A. 1297 (Sept. 11, 2001). The "Tampa" case as it is popularly referred, is a classic case
demonstrating the general attitude of Australians towards refugees, a specific category of migrants. The
Tampa saga refers to the problem of unauthorized boat arrivals, which began in August 2001 with
Australia's refusal to accept over 433 people rescued at sea by a Norwegian registered container ship, MV
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heart policy.' 55  Since society in Australia is more closed to immigrants in
general, partners from the developing world may become wholly dependent
on their sponsors or nominators, not only for financial support, but social
and psychological support as well.1
5 6
The lack of material and emotional support to immigrants in Australia
may exacerbate situations of domestic violence. For example, a sponsoring
or nominating spouse could threaten to withdraw sponsorship unless his or
her spouse subordinates themselves. 157  In fact, one of the reasons that a
body of jurisprudence is developing in this area is because some threats have
been actualized and the nomination or sponsorship withdrawn.' 58 This leaves
Tampa. Subsequently, a standoff ensued between Australia and Norway, the former insisting the
"rescuees" be returned to Indonesia-their original port of departure, while the latter argued that Australia
had a moral obligation to take them in. Australia, after all, was where the rescuees indicated they wished to
go in order to seek asylum as refugees. While public interest litigants-among them the Victorian Council
for Civil Liberties Incorporated and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission-brought
proceedings against the Government, the standoff was resolved at an international level, via what has
become known as the "Pacific Solution." Under the "Pacific Solution," they are instead trans-shipped to
neighbouring Pacific States such as Nauru and Papua New Guinea, for processing. Canberra argues that
measures such as this will deter illegal migrants or "queue jumpers." See also Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs and Others v. Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated and Others
(2001) F.C.A. 1329 (Sept. 18, 2001); and the final appeal to the High Court: Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs and Others v. Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated and Others (2001)
F.C.A. 1865 (Dec. 21, 2001).
"' Chris J. Bakweshaga, in HOWARD ADELMAN & JOtN SORENSON, AFRICAN REFUGEES:
DEVELOPMENT AND REPATRIATION 3 (1994). Though describing the situation in traditional African
socieiies, the same words to a large extent apply today:
In traditional [African] societies, where regional or national frontiers were
changeable, some asylum seekers who crossed into neighboring regions or countries were
welcomed by kin. Assistance given to them was informal and unpublicized. Available
resources were shared equitably between asylum seekers and host communities, and a
few distinctions were made between them.
Id. Corrina Reinke argues that this custom is somewhat diluted as African Nations are "stretched beyond
[their] limit when thousands or hundreds of thousands of refugees arrive." Corrina Reinke, The African
Refugee Problem: Social, Political and Legal Aspects, in 13 INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THESSALONIKI, THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON UNIVERSAL, REGIONAl
AND NATIONAL LEVEL 873, 874 (1987).
156 The level of dependency may be less in major towns and cities that have a variety of entertainment
and social options, than in small or country towns. Narayan, supra note 153, at 145 (attributing heightened
vulnerability of abuse among immigrant women to "dependent immigration status" especially
"economically, psychologically and linguistically"). See generally, Christopher J. Bakwesegha, Forced
Migration in Africa the OAU Convention, in AFRICAN RFEFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT AID AND REPATRIATION
(H. Adelman. & J. Sorenson, eds. 1994).
15 Meroka's wife, for instance, made threats to have him deported. Meroka v. Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) F.C.A. 482, at 5.
158 E.g., Doan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319,
at *9; Miran Bozic (2002) M.R.T.A. 244, at 3; Leslie Alden Reggie (2001) M.R.T.A. 4453, at 5; Malik v.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) F.C.R. 291; and Olivera Malek (2001) M.R.T.A.
247.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
the nominated or sponsored spouse in fear of deportation. Nor do some
spouses possess skills or qualifications recognized by the Australian labor
market or speak English. 59 In addition, because immigrants generally lack
the necessary social network, they may encounter difficulty finding even
part-time employment, especially where the nominator or sponsor is
reluctant to help them do so.
These problems are made worse where the applicant falls into an
abusive relationship. In addition to cultural barriers and general ignorance
of their rights, victims might not even know where to lodge a complaint.
Victims may become frustrated and reluctant to pursue the matter, and may
fear being branded a "pest" by the foreign authorities. To illustrate this
point are the words of a woman who suffered domestic violence at the hands
of her Australian spouse:
I was still shy, easily frightened and a bit naive when I arrived
here. For example, when I ask[ed] him to teach me how to use
the washing machine, he would get angry with me. He would
shout at me, "You're stupid; you do not know anything .... " If
only it was just words; he would complement this with
violence. He struck me often on the head with his heavy hands
. . . If I ask him to repeat or explain some words, he would
scream and slap me on the neck again. He also repeatedly
called me a liar. . . . When it came to lovemaking, he would
force me to perform obscene acts he saw on video. He treated
me like a plaything or animal . .. If I did not agree, he would
hit me ... I lived those days with the fear that he might kill me.
I tried everything to placate him. The one thing constant was
fear. 16
0
Where there is a friend or a relative willing to assist an abused
individual the trauma suffered is likely to be reduced. Because of legal
159 Narayan succinctly summarizes this position: "Dependent immigration status legally prohibits
[spouses] from seeking employment. Many lack fluency in English, a factor that impedes their ability to
negotiate the routines of everyday life without the [spouse's] assistance." Narayan, supra note 155, at 145.
Along the same vein, judging from the English grammatical expressions used when adducing
evidence, immigrants such as Mr. Doan might experience difficulties finding employment in Australia. See
discussion, supra, accompanying notes 147, 149 and 150.
160 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality Before the Law: Justice for Women, pt. IV.!0.12,
available at http://www.aust.. .edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/69/voll/ALRC69ch10.html
[hereinafter ALRC Report].
161 In Doan, (2000) F.C.A. 909, LEXIS 319, at *12 and Bozic, (2002) M.R.T.A. 244, at 4 Doan and
Bozic were taken in by friends after their spouses kicked them out of the matrimonial home.
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complications, the best solution for this problem is policy intervention by the
Australian Government. Australian Embassies and Consulates abroad
should issue pamphlets or brochures that contain resources and information
on domestic violence to spouses and partners wishing to immigrate into
Australia. 1
62
D. Insistence on Procedure at the Expense of Substance
The complexity of Australian immigration law can create a barrier to
any immigrant, especially to those being abused. Any understanding of
immigration law requires navigating complex legislation. Getting a copy of
the Migration Act and its Regulations is not very difficult, but going through
its 507 Sections and eight parts can be a tedious exercise. Often, sections
must be read with other sections that inevitably reference other subsections
and sub-subsections. 63  The same applies to the Regulations, with further
division into paragraphs and subparagraphs. 164 So to understand, for
162 See infra Part IV.
163 If a spouse wishes to apply for a permanent visa based on domestic violence grounds, the judicial
process begins by, first, lodging his or her application with the Minister's delegate. But preceding this, he
or she must read and grasp the following sections of the Migration Act: § 65 (t)(a) and (b) (decision to
grant or refuse a visa); § 66 (1)-(5) (notification of decision); § 67 (way visa is granted); § 68 (when visa
takes effect); § 69 (effect of compliance or non-compliance); §§ 52-64 (code of procedure for dealing
fairly, efficiently and quickly with visa applications); § 501(l)-(12) (refusal or cancellation of visa on
character grounds; and § 40(1)-(2) (circumstances for granting visas). Migration Act, 1958 (Austl.).
Second, if a spouse is aggrieved by the delegate's decision she or he may appeal to the MRT once they
have referred to sections: § 348(l)-(2) and § 349(1)-(4) (MRT's power to review); § 337 (Interpretation
section); § 338(l)-(9) (outlining the types of decisions the MRT can review); § 347(t)-(5) (application
proper); § 351(l)-(7) (Minister's power to substitute a MRT decision with a favorable decision on "public
interest" grounds), and § 349(a) and (b) (Minister's powers to issue a Conclusive certificate affirming a
decision from the MRT). Third, if he or she is still dissatisfied he or she may appeal to the Federal Court,
which requires a reading of sections: § 475A (jurisdiction of the Federal Court); § 484 (exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Court); § 474(1)-(5) (Privative clause; this section is important since it
distinguishes between decisions that are "final and conclusive", and those that can be "appealed against",
"reviewed", "quashed" or "called in question in any court"); § 476(1)-(6) (limiting powers of the Federal
Court in relation to Privative clause decisions); § 477(l)-(3) (time limits); and § 478 (persons with capacity
to make applications). Finally, the High Court, the final court for a dissatisfied party, which to know and
comprehend matters of jurisdiction, requires reading of the following sections of the Judiciary Act 1903: §
20 (appeals from judges of federal jurisdiction); § 35 (appeal from courts of States); § 3 (Interpretation);
and § 25 (powers of court to extend to whole Commonwealth); and § 47(V) (original jurisdiction of High
Court) of the Australian Constitution.
" 4 To illustrate this point, I begin by looking at the Migration Regulations, Table of Provisions,
which lead me to Division 1.5, Regulations 1.21-1.27, and titled "Special Provisions relating to domestic
violence." Migration Regulations, 1994 (Austl.). Regulation 1.21 (the "Interpretation" Regulation) fails to
define "domestic violence." ld. Instead, it defines the term "violence" to "include threats of violence." Id.
Flipping through the pages, I come across into Regulation 1.23, which outlines the elements of a domestic
violence claim. Id. Subparagraph (2)(b) comes to rescue, albeit introducing a new term: a reference to
relevant domestic violence is a reference to violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that
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instance, the process of applying for a permanent visa under the domestic
violence exception, one must review several parts of the Act and its
Regulations. This task is difficult, even for experience counsel. The task
may be impossible for an immigrant who may be unaware of the Act's
existence, unable to obtain the latest edition, and lacking the skills to follow
or understand it.
Unfortunately, some courts and immigration tribunals have adopted
the narrow view that a failure to observe any of the myriad statutory
requirements is fatal to a visa application, notwithstanding a collapsed
marital relationship. In Thi Lan Du v. Minister for Migration and
Multicultural Affairs, 165 one of the issues before the court was the scope of
Regulation 1.26(c), which requires that statutory declarations made by
competent persons state the opinion that the alleged victim suffered
domestic violence. 166 Declarations from Dr. Tran and Mrs. Knox, a
registered Psychologist were offered as evidence. Dr. Tran stated, "Thi Lan
Du attended our surgery at Campsie on 21/2/97 with multiple bruises which
were allegedly caused by domestic violence (assaulted by husband).' 67 In
summary and recommendation Mrs. Knox stated, "[Du] certainly expressed
sentiments and a psychological condition that was consistent with an
individual who has suffered from domestic violence and a marital
breakdown."'
168
After acknowledging this evidence Judge Mathews argued:
causes the alleged victim, or a member of the alleged victim's family, to fear for, or to be apprehensive
about, the alleged victim's personal well-being or safety. Id.
But is this what Parliament intended the definition of "domestic violence" to be; or is an
individual left to infer that "relevant domestic violence" means the same as "domestic violence"? No other
Regulation, in Division 1.5 or otherwise, attempts to define the term. Although I am left wondering, my
legal mind tells me to that it is possible to find a working definition from other sources such as other related
legislation (for examples, see infra note 187), judicial precedents, or a Law Dictionary. But the question is
would a layman think likewise? Domestic violence claims should be proved by statutory declarations, one
sworn by the victim and the other by two competent persons (Regulation 1.25(1), (2) and (3) read together
with Regulation 1.26 (a)-(f)). However, as with the case with "domestic violence," the interpretation
section of the Regulations, Regulation 1.21, fails to define what the term "statutory declarations" means.
But, unlike in the former case, it makes reference to a second legislation, the Statutory Declarations Act,
1959 (Austl.), and declares that the term "statutory declaration" "means the same as statutory declaration
under the Statutory Declarations Act, 1959, [(Cth)]." Subregulation (2) and (3) outline the contents of a
"victim" declaration. Statutory Declarations Act 1959, Subregulation (2) and (3) (Austl.). This time
around, Regulation 1.21 defines the term "competent person" in subregulations (1)(a) and (b), which should
be read together with subregulation (2). Regulation 1.27 should also be borne in mind since it addresses
statutory declarations that are inadmissible in evidence in courts and immigration tribunals.
6' (2001)F.C.A. 1115.
:66 Id. para. 15.
167 Id. para. 10.
1 61 Id. para. 12.
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The Regulations are in specific and peremptory terms. It is not
sufficient compliance . . .with these Regulations for a
competent person simply to note the consistency between a
person's presentation and their account of domestic violence, or
even [its] occurrence. The Regulations require that the
competent person express an opinion in very specific terms,
namely, as to whether relevant domestic violence ... has been
suffered by a person. 69
Technically the judge was correct since Regulation 1.26 states that a
competent person "must state that, in [his or her] opinion, relevant domestic
violence ... has been suffered by" an alleged victim; yet the opinion lacked
practicality by failing to consider all surrounding circumstances.
Interpreting statutes may not be easy, but it is an art that requires decision-
makers to exercise prudence. 170 Notwithstanding the fact that the
declarations failed to meet the exact regulatory directive, they did not strike
far from the purpose. Reading the literal words of the two experts
combined, what else could they refer to, other than that Mrs. Du was a
victim of domestic violence caused by Mr. Du? It also seems harsh to
expect a medical practitioner to depart from a statement of observation and
arrive at a different conclusion.
As a result of the Du court's strict adherence to the statutory
requirements to prove domestic violence some subsequent statutory
declarations have been tailored to fit within this "Mathews box" to avoid
casting victims into this technical pitfall. 17 1 In Cakmak, Fikri ("Cakmak
169 Id. para. 18.
170 See Judge Mason in-K & S Lake City Freighters, Ltd. v. Gordon & Goten, Ltd. (1985) 157 C.L.R.
309, 315, criticizing the narrow literal approach to statutory interpretation: "Problems of legal interpretation
are not solved satisfactorily by ritual incantations which emphasize the clarity of meaning which words
have when viewed in isolation, divorced from their context. The modem approach to interpretation insists
that the context be considered in the Ist instance."
While Dennis Lemieux, Judicial Deference in Canadian Administrative Law.- The Pragmatic and
Functional Approach. Puschrvanathan v. Canada, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 757 (2002) acknowledges: "The
supreme court of Canada has rendered hundreds of pages of decisions dealing with the standard of review
applicable to public agency and tribunal interpretation errors. The determination of the right standard of
review is a nightmare for trial judges as well as practitioners and law students."
On the other hand, Robert Gregory, Overcoming Text in Age of Textualism: A Practitioner's Guide to
Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 451, argues: "Most battles of statutory
interpretation play out like a fixed game of cards.... The court holds the ultimate trump card."
For an overview of statutory interpretation in select European states and the United States of America,
see D. NEL MACCORMICK & ROBERTS S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(1991).
1' Cakmak, Fikri (2001) M.R.T.A. 0699 (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Cakmak 1], and Cakmak, Fikri
(2001) M.R.T.A. 0699 (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Cakmak 2] are MRT examples.
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1,,), 172 and Cakmak, Fikri ("Cakmak 2") 173 supplementary declarations were
adduced, by the same competent persons-Dr. Halil Munir and Hanife
Guducu, psychologists, that met the "expression of opinion" requirement. In
a "revised" declaration, Dr. Munir stated:
Please refer to my previous statutory declaration dated 6
October 2000. Further consultation with Mr. F. Cakmak, I
confirmed that in my opinion [he] is suffering from
anxiety/depression symptoms secondary to his marriage
breakdown and to the verbal/physical abuse. He was a victim
of domestic violence and this has caused him to be concerned
for his well being and safety.
174
The psychologist expressed similar sentiments, though merely rearranging
the Doctor's words:
I refer to my previous statutory declaration 9/5/00 and in order
to avoid any doubt I confirm the contents and in my opinion Mr.
Fikri Cakmak, has been a victim of domestic violence. The
violence he has suffered has caused him to be concerned for his
own personal well being and safety. 175
Nonetheless, some Federal Court judges, such as Judge Ryan in
Meroka, laudably declined to follow this rigid view. 176 Because of the
conflicts between courts, the burden now rests on a full Federal Court or
High Court, to declare the correct legal position. In Meroka, Judge Ryan
adopted a wider perspective in forming a decision regarding the
admissibility of statutory declarations made by competent persons. 77 The
Judge examined the standard document, Form 1040, prescribed by the
DIMA to be completed by competent persons. 178 This Form is titled
"Statutory Declaration. under the Domestic Violence Provision of the
Migration Regulations" and contains various sections requiring a competent
person to complete after assessing a victim. After acknowledging the
contents of this form, the judge summarized the law in the following words:
172 See Cakmak 1, (2001) M.R.T.A. 0699.
173 See Cakmak 2, (2001) M.R.T.A. 4656.
:74 Cakmak 1, (2001) M.R.T.A. 0699, para. 38.75 Cakmak 2, (2001) M.R.T.A. 4656, para. 38.176 See Meroka v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) F.C.A. 482.
177 See id.
171 Id. para. 18.
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I do not consider that the competent person need[s] [to] state
expressly that in his or her opinion relevant domestic violence
has been suffered. The requisite statement of opinion may be
conveyed by implication having regard to the way in which the
standard form directs the attention of the competent person to
the definition of "domestic violence" in Reg.l.23(2)(b). The
implication arises in the context of that direction from the
insertion in the respective spaces provided of the name and date
of birth of the victim and the full name of the person believed to
have perpetrated the domestic violence. 1
79
I find this wider view more persuasive and practical when compared with
the narrower view Judge Mathews advanced in Du,'80 particularly because it
is a more practical in approach.
E. Legal position of Fianc~es
More legal complications exist for Australian immigrants who are not
yet married to an Australian citizen before their arrival. Although the
Migration Act allows them to follow their counterparts into Australia,' 8 two
immigration concerns arise. First, the law requires the intended marriage to
be formed within nine months from the date of entry of the foreign182
spouse. Second, perhaps more shocking, if a fiancee suffers domestic
violence before marriage, he or she cannot invoke the domestic violence
exception. 83 They can only invoke these provisions "if they have already
married their sponsor."'14 This requirement effectively precludes fiancres
from using the domestic violence exception. Any abuse or violence suffered
before marriage proceedings are completed is irrelevant. Some studies show
179 Id. para. 34.
... Du v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) F.C.A. 115, para. 18.
181 Migration Regulations, 1994, sched. 2, subclasses 300 (Prospective Spouse, applying from
overseas) and 831 (Prospective Spouse, applying on-shore) (Austl.).
182 See also DIMA, MIGRATING TO AUSTRALIA: PROSPECTIVE MARRIAGE MIGRATION FIANCE(E), at
http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/f fianc6.htm#eligibility (last modified Feb. 17, 2003) (requiring
prospective spouses to prove they "have met and are personally known to each other").
113 Migration Regulations, 1994, subclasses 300 & 820 (Austl.).
184 DIMA, FACT SHEET 38, at http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/38domestic.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2003). See also Migration Regulations, 1994, sched. 2, subclass 309.22 1(3)(b) (Austl.)
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that even at this early stage some spouses are still abusive. 185 In the words
of one Filipino woman:
I trusted him wholly because I didn't know the situation here. I
trusted that we would get married here because he took me
from the Philippines in a decent manner ... weeks passed and I
kept on wondering because he wasn't making a move to
organize our wedding. By this time, I was already pregnant. It
seemed he had forgotten everything. Once when I asked, his
reply cut through me like lightening, 'I don't know. I changed
my mind. I do not want to marry you any more.' It was as if
the skies caved in on me .... I wanted to die .... Even if I
wanted to go back to the Philippines, I couldn't face my parents
and I was jobless and everything . . . . You know how
conservative our place [is]. They wouldn't understand; it's like
you're the one at fault. You will be humiliated in your family's
and people's eyes because they would think you've tainted the
honor which is so valued there.
86
IV. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is an all too common occurrence in Australian
homes, irrespective of whether one or both of the spouses is a "local."' 87
Even so, domestic violence victims, whether local or foreign, find it difficult
to report such incidents to the authorities.' 88 According to the jurisprudence
that has built up in Australia, only when victims are faced with deportation,
or when the situation becomes otherwise intolerable, do victims open up and
185 ALRC Report, supra note 160, para. 10.23. In the same paragraph, it cites the Iredale Report,
which noted that "some men have been heard to boast about having a housekeeper, cleaner, cook and
sexual partner... at the cost of a one-way airfare." Id.is' Id. For a more detailed discussion of abusers using immnigration status to subordinate their victims,
see supra Part IV.
117 Described by the New South Wales Department of Community Services, as "the most common
form of assault in Australia today." For this reason, most states in Australia have legislated against this
social evil. See e.g., Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act, 1989 (Austl.); Domestic Violence Act,
1994 (Austl.); Domestic Violence Act, 1999 (Austl.); and Domestic Violence Act, 1986 (Austl.). For
statistics, see DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INCEST RESOURCE CENTRE, AUSTRALIAN STATISTICS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at http://www.dvirc.org.au/resources/Statistics.htm (last modified Mar. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INCEST RE-SOURCE CENTRE].i8s DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INCEST RESOURCE CENTRE, supra note 187, at 1, quotes a survey
conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 1996, which pointed out that out of the 6300 female
interviewees who had been physically assaulted in that year, only "19% reported the incident to police"
while 18% "had never told anyone about the incident."
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seek external assistance. Reasons for this failure to report include cultural
factors and the sheer trauma of immigration itself. This is especially true for
those coming from the Third World. The DIMA has a long series of
questions used to assess the genuineness of relationships between
Australians and non-Australians ranging from the background and
development of the relationship to their plans for married life.'
89 Although
some may assume it is simple for an immigrant to answer such questions,
they may intimidate even the most genuine partner or spouse. Further, some
spouses may be unable to answer some of the questions, such as, "where will
you live in Australia," raising doubts in the mind of an immigration official
while simultaneously reducing the applicant's credibility and chances of
obtaining a visa. Even in cases where an individual succeeds in obtaining a
temporary visa and later suffers domestic violence, the initial negative view
created by the overseas government official may override the desire to report
instances of abuse to the same authorities. The Australian Law Reform
Commission recognized that "women from different cultures may be
especially reluctant to approach the police, particularly where they are afraid
of being deported."' 190
Beyond legal revisions, this problem requires a shift in the Australian
government's immigration policy. For example, Government officials
working in overseas offices need specialized training in personal and human
relations, in which they learn not to discourage prospective immigrants with
valid grounds for application. Such training should be structured to provide
sufficient knowledge to adopt and retain a more positive and approachable
attitude. Thus, in cases where a prospective immigrant finds an
approachable official overseas, a more positive impression may be created
about Australian government officials generally. In turn, this may
encourage an abused spouse to report instances of abuse if ever they occur
overseas. Commendably, Canberra has addressed this concern. Today, each
DIMA Regional Office has one Domestic Violence Officer with specialized
training.'91
Part of the problem foreign spouses face is lack of information
concerning where to lodge complaints or seek relevant assistance. The
answer is simple: provide the requisite information. 192 An appropriate time
189 See DIMA, Procedures Advice Manual, supra note 38.
'90 ALRC Report, supra note 160, para. 10.19.
"9" Id. para. 10.20.
192 However, as Uma reminds:
[S]uch information [should be translated] in the appropriate languages and ensure
that immigrant[s] . . . obtain [it]. In order for this to happen the [Government],
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to do so would be at the visa issuing stage. Immigrants should be given an
information packet on Australia. Generally, this packet should contain
information on the lifestyle, institutions, agencies, and centers offering
assistance. Although a domestic violence victim needs to act on his or her
intention to report abuse, having the knowledge of where and how to report
it encourages victims to come forward to the authorities. To have sufficient
information for the reporting victim, the packet should contain: details of
police and fire stations; foreign embassies and consuls; ethnic groupings;
hospitals, clinics and other health institutions; courts, tribunals and quasi-
judicial institutions; domestic violence and community services;
employment and recruitment agencies; financial institutions; education and
learning institutions and a summary of their rights as under Australian law.
It should be written in simple, easy-to-understand English. Measures taken
by the Philippine government in this regard are commendable. 193 Since
1989, the Government has required all persons intending to emigrate as
spouses or prospective spouses to attend counseling at the Commission on
Filipinos Overseas about such matters as cultural differences, their rights,
and available support and welfare services' 94 in their country of destination.
These efforts are complemented by DIMA's Manila Office, which requires
proof of attendance to these counseling sessions before a visa application is
processed.
The legal position of individuals who have immigrated to Australia as
fianc~es or prospective spouses remains problematic. Despite the reality of
domestic violence occurring in such relationships, the legislature has failed
to address this problem effectively if at all. More specifically, the law fails
to recognize that there is little or no difference between domestic violence
inside or outside marriage for immigrant victims. It is easy to imagine that
both married and unmarried victims have similar challenges to getting
citizenship. Based on this assumption, it would be proper to amend this part
of the legislation to bring it to terms with reality. Effectively, this will make
fianc6es eligible to benefit from the domestic violence concessions currently
offered to their married counterparts under immigration law.
I end with the words of Uma Narayan, which while specific to the
U.S. case, apply to Australia as well:
Immigrant Communities [and Agencies] need to deal with their denial of domestic
violence, and to support actively a range of programs and institutions to assist battered
immigrant [spouses].
Urs, supra note 153, at 143, 156.
93 ALRC Report, supra note 160, para 10.41.
"I Id.
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A nation that prides itself on being a nation of immigrants
ought to take pride in protecting persons who are involved in
the processing of acquiring permanent immigration status and
in becoming its citizens. An immigration policy that was truly
sensitive to issues of domestic violence [should] structure its
regulations and priorities in such a manner that afforded the
maximum of protection to the interests of battered immigrant
[spouses].' 95
The identified "gaps" and changes proposed are manageable and could be
implemented through amending the current legislation. Such amendments
would reduce the constraints forcing immigrant spouses and fianc~es to
remain in abusive relationships.
'" Uma, supra note 153, at 156.

